Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has sometimes seemed like an alliance in search of purpose. After this week’s NATO summit in Madrid, that accusation is harder to sustain. NATO provided the framework for an emergency Western effort to support Ukraine after Russia’s unprovoked invasion in February. Four months later, the alliance put this on a longer-term basis with serious financial, strategic and regional implications. Important uncertainties still remain.
NATO’s realignment has four elements. The first is strategic—recognizing that attempts to form a cooperative relationship with Russia are over for the foreseeable future, and that Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, inexcusable in itself, also marks a broader confrontation with the West. The second is the reversal of the post-1989 era of shrinking defense budgets. This has now been replaced by extended deterrence, marked by aid to Ukraine, higher military spending for the next decade and a sevenfold increase in the number of NATO troops on high alert to 300,000.
The third element is a partial reversal of the European deployment by the US. America’s pivot to the Pacific in the face of China’s rise has not been abandoned, but President Biden is now authorizing the largest increase in US military presence in Europe since the Cold War. Significantly, most of this American increase will be in the eastern part of our continent, with a new headquarters in Poland, 5,000 additional troops in Romania and a more intensive deployment in the Baltic states.
Finally, NATO expanded its membership by formally inviting Sweden and Finland – the latter of which has an 800-mile land border with Russia – to join the alliance. This ends more than 70 years of neutrality between the two northern nations. It is a sign of how decisively the invasion of Ukraine has destroyed wider trust in Russia. But there are huge military implications in the Baltics. This was achieved only after Turkey, a more than usually decisive NATO member during the current conflict, lifted its previous veto, perhaps amid promises that the US would soon supply it with upgraded F-16 fighter jets.
These are big changes. Russian aggression has pushed the West across a major political divide. However, in some ways it’s also a return to the once-familiar security landscape. It finds that NATO is actually starting a new mission from the Cold War. This potentially marks the birth of a new era of collective Western deterrence of Russian power. The implications for domestic and international politics should not be underestimated. But the world – and Europe – of the 2020s is very different from that of the late 1940s.
Whether NATO’s new strategy will develop in a similar fashion to the Cold War, perhaps over the same length of time and with the same ultimate success, is unknown. Much depends on what happens on the battlefield in the coming months. All democracies will face major dilemmas about spending priorities and military commitments. A change of administration in Washington could radically change the outlook, leaving Europe struggling to maintain sufficient support and tempting Russia to simply wait out the confrontation.
It is important not to exaggerate, especially prematurely. Yet it is an ongoing problem for Britain. Words and promises are not the same as plans, results, implementation, training and costs. Much of what was agreed in Madrid will take years to come into effect, if at all. Boris Johnson and some of the ministers maneuvering to replace him are self-made men whose bloated tongue is aimed solely at the Tory Party. An example of this is threats against China of the kind made by Liz Truss this week. Protecting Ukraine and deterring Russia is more than enough to keep us going.
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