This is the edited transcript of a discussion between Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State and National Security Adviser, and Edward Luce, National Editor of the US Financial Times, which took place on May 7 in Washington.
Financial Times: Earlier this year, we celebrated the 50th anniversary of Nixon’s visit to China, the Shanghai Communiqué. You, of course, were the organizer, the orchestrator of this Sino-US agreement. And that was a big change in the Cold War: you separated China from Russia. It feels like we’ve gone 180 degrees. And now Russia and China are in very close relations again. My initial question to you is: are we in a new Cold War with China?
Henry Kissinger: At the time we opened up to China, Russia was the main enemy, but our relations with China were as bad as they could be. Our view when opening up to China was that it is unwise, when you have two enemies, to treat them exactly the same.
What led to the discovery was the tension that developed autonomously between Russia and China. [Former Soviet Union head of state Leonid] Brezhnev could not imagine that China and the United States could come together. But Mao, despite all his ideological hostility, was ready to start talks.
In principle of [Sino-Russian] the union is against its own interests, it is now established. But it doesn’t seem to me like it’s a permanent relationship.
FT: I guess it would be in America’s geopolitical interest to promote more distance between Russia and China. Is this wrong?
HK: The global geopolitical situation will change significantly after the end of the war in Ukraine. And it is not natural for China and Russia to have the same interests on all foreseeable issues. I don’t think we can generate possible disagreements, but I think circumstances will. After the war in Ukraine, Russia will have to at least re-evaluate its attitude towards Europe and its general attitude towards NATO. I think it is unwise to take an opposing stance against two enemies in a way that unites them, and once we accept this principle in our relations with Europe and in our internal discussions, I think that history will provide opportunities in which we can apply the differential approach.
This does not mean that any of them will become intimate friends of the West, it just means that when it comes to specific issues, we leave open the possibility of having a different approach. In the coming period, we should not unite Russia and China as an integral part.
FT: The Biden administration defines its great geopolitical challenge as democracy versus autocracy. Do I have an indirect hint that this is a wrong framing?
HK: We need to be aware of the differences in ideology and interpretation that exist. We must use this consciousness to apply it in our own analysis of the importance of problems in their emergence, instead of making it a major problem of confrontation, unless we are ready to make regime change a major goal of our policy. I think that, given the development of technology and the enormous destructiveness of the weapons that now exist, [seeking regime change] it may be imposed on us by the hostility of others, but we must avoid generating it with our own attitudes.
FT: You probably have more experience than anyone alive on how to manage the confrontation between two superpowers with nuclear weapons. But today’s nuclear language, which comes tight and fast [Russian president Vladimir] Putin, from the people around him, where do you put this in relation to the threat we face today?
HK: We are now [faced with] with technologies in which the speed of exchange, the subtlety of inventions can lead to levels of catastrophe we could not even imagine. And the strange aspect of the current situation is that weapons are multiplying on both sides and their sophistication is increasing every year.
But there is almost no international discussion about what would happen if weapons were actually used. My call in general, from whichever country you are, is to understand that we are now living in a whole new era and we have gone beyond ignoring this aspect. But as technology spreads around the world, as is the case, diplomacy and war will need different content, and that will be a challenge.
FT: You have met with Putin 20 to 25 times. Russia’s military nuclear doctrine is that they will respond with nuclear weapons if they feel the regime is under existential threat. Where do you think Putin’s red line is in this situation?
HK: I met Putin as a student of international affairs about once a year for maybe 15 years for purely academic strategic discussions. I thought his main beliefs were something like a mystical belief in Russian history. . . and that he felt offended in this sense not by something we did especially in the beginning, but by this great chasm that opened up with Europe and the East. He was offended and threatened because Russia was threatened with the takeover of the whole area by NATO. This does not justify and I would not envisage an attack on the scale of the conquest of a recognized state.
I think he misjudged the situation he is facing internationally, and he obviously misjudged Russia’s ability to maintain such a large enterprise – and when the time comes to settle, everyone must take this into account that we are not coming back. to previous relations, but to a position on Russia that will be different because of that – and not because we demand it, but because they produce it.
FT: Do you think Putin is getting good information, and if not, what additional miscalculations should we prepare for?
HK: In all these crises, one has to try to understand what the inner red line is for the opposite number. . . The obvious question is how long will this escalation last and how much room is there for further escalation? Or he has reached the limit of his capabilities and must decide at what point the escalation of the war will strain his society to a point that will limit his ability to pursue international politics as a great power in the future.
I have no idea when he gets to this point. When this point is reached, will it escalate into a category of weapons that have never been used in the 70 years of its existence? If this line is crossed, it will be an extremely significant event. Because we have not crossed globally what the next dividing lines would be. One thing we can’t do, I think, is just accept it.
FT: You met [Chinese president] Xi Jinping many times and his predecessors – you know China well. What lessons does China learn from this?
HK: I suspect that every Chinese leader will now be thinking about how to avoid getting into the situation that Putin has been in, and how to be in a situation where in any crisis that may arise, they will not have a major role of the world turned against them.
Transcribed by James Polity in Washington
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