Joe Biden is determined to succeed where his predecessors failed. He recognizes the central role of Indo-Pacific policy in America’s 21st century interests and is committed to introducing a new US strategy that prioritizes the region, even as global events conspire to dissipate its administration.
George W. Bush’s foreign policy was hijacked by al Qaeda on September 11, 2001. The global war on terrorism and the catastrophic decision to invade Iraq became his main foreign policy focus and overshadowed his success elsewhere (see, for example, PEPFAR).
Barack Obama suffers from severance. His first secretary of state, Hillary Clinton, tried to lead the administration’s efforts to shift priorities to tackle China’s rise, but economic problems at home and ongoing challenges in the Middle East continued to derail efforts, so Obama’s policy in Asia never changed. united and his travels in the region were largely nonsense (except for the parts that were actively disturbing.)
Donald Trump’s corruption, lies and attacks on democracy have diverted attention from his foreign policy disasters. And his impeachment of trying to blackmail Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, revelations that he was going to pull the United States out of NATO, and his relationship with one of the world’s most despised dictators, Vladimir Putin, diverted attention from an equally horrific policy in Asia. included a desire to withdraw US troops from South Korea and a marriage to the world’s most disgusting dictator (a division of the small state), Kim Jong Un. Oh, there was also his family’s murky relationship with the Chinese and the fact that we were obviously much closer to the war with North Korea in 2017 than anyone knew at the time (which was before Trump’s thunderous moment with Kim Chen Un.)
Biden, by contrast, has made it clear that trans-Pacific issues will be high on his foreign policy and national security agenda from his first days in power. When Secretary of State Anthony Blinken outlined the administration’s “foreign policy for the American people” in March 2021, US-China relations stood out for their paramount importance. Days later, a sometimes fierce meeting between Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan and Chinese officials in Alaska highlighted both the importance the administration attaches to relations and the difficult problems underlying them. Less than a month later, our rivalry with China was the dominant theme in Biden’s first joint address to Congress.
As with other presidents in this century, many forces competed for a valuable administrative bandwidth. COVID’s end-of-crisis engineering, while tackling new options and looking for ways to promote economic recovery, would require the full resources of almost any other administration. But internationally, the world also posed complex problems. The administration’s decision to finally end the 20-year war in Afghanistan, crucial to shifting the focus to the new priorities set by Biden and his team, has posed enormous logistical and security challenges. Yet, within days of the administration of the largest postwar evacuation of personnel in modern US history and the turmoil of a terrorist attack on Kabul airport, Biden’s team followed its Indo-Pacific plans.
Air transport in Kabul began on August 15, 2021 and ended two weeks later. Even as the evacuation continued, Vice President Kamala Harris traveled to Asia to emphasize the region’s importance to the administration. By mid-September, the Biden administration and the governments of the United Kingdom and Australia had announced a major new security pact, AUKUS, to promote security in the Indo-Pacific region. On September 24, the Biden administration hosted the first-ever meeting of Quad leaders, another Asia-Pacific alliance involving Japan, Australia, India and the United States. It was a remarkable demonstration of commitment and focus, especially in light of recent history.
At the beginning of 2022, of course, another global crisis arose. The fact is that the crisis has been brewing for months, while intelligence sources have indicated that Russia is preparing to invade Ukraine. The administration has kept abreast of these developments, and in fact their warnings have helped to activate and shape the West’s response in support of the government of Zelensky and the Ukrainian people. With Russia’s invasion on 24 February, the administration took the lead, providing not only direct support to Ukraine but also in the context of NATO’s unprecedented response to its unanimity, level of coordination and effectiveness. Huge sums of money and military resources were provided, and complex diplomatic and military coordination took place on a daily basis as the war progressed.
Russia’s aggression against its democratic neighbor has become a watershed for geopolitics. NATO is likely to expand with the accession of Sweden and Finland. Now is probably a new period of prolonged tension with Russia. However, the United States remains focused on the broader global picture. In March, US and Chinese officials met in Rome to discuss Ukraine and send a message to the Chinese that the United States and our allies would appreciate their help in mitigating Russian progress and that we would look very unhappy if the Chinese provided military support to Russia. . Recognizing that Putin and China see themselves as strategic partners, the United States also saw the importance that Russia’s weakening would have for its Indo-Pacific plans – and the effect that Russia’s success could have on China’s temptation to act in a similar way. against Taiwan.
For this last reason, the United States is very active in ensuring that Asian countries are involved in the alliance against Russia. And the United States is working to blunt some of the historical ties that countries like India, which plays a key role in the Quartet, have with Moscow.
Last week, at an ASEAN summit hosted by the Washington administration, these issues were highlighted as efforts to tighten ties with Southeast Asian countries intensified. But instead of turning the discussion to Ukraine, the issues raised were largely about deepening co-operation as part of a broader Indo-Pacific strategy. Efforts have been made to emphasize that the aim is not to oppose China, but that the United States really wanted to move forward by strengthening regional priorities in a way that previous administrations did not. At an event at the American Institute of Peace, NSC Indo-Pacific Coordinator Kurt Campbell said: “There was a feeling that in previous [American] The administrations had set out to focus on the Indo-Pacific region, but we were faced with other urgent challenges that distracted us. I think there is a deep meaning that cannot be repeated. “
The ASEAN event was followed by President Biden’s first trip to Asia, which took him to South Korea and Japan. Together with the ASEAN summit, the purpose of the trip is to deepen critical ties. These include strengthening relations with and between the two countries. These include meeting with the new, more openly pro-US President of South Korea, Yun Suk Yel, and discussing ways to increase Seoul’s support for US initiatives in Ukraine, the region and Taiwan’s defense. It will also focus on strengthening America’s commitment to deter threats from North Korea. Another goal will be to advance an administrative plan called the Indo-Pacific Framework, which will strengthen economic ties with and between countries in the region. For an administration with an allergy to new trade deals, IPEF is perhaps the next best thing, and discussions during the trip will focus on how broad a group can become.
Before starting, National Security Adviser Sullivan said: “The message we are trying to send during this trip is a message of a positive vision of what the world might look like if democracies and open societies around the world stand together to shape the rules of the road, define the security architecture of the region, strengthen strong, powerful, historical alliances, and we plan to put this on display for four days bilaterally with the Republic of Korea and Japan, through the Quartet, through the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, this will send a powerful message. We believe that this message will be heard everywhere. “
While Sullivan does not mention China in this context, and while Campbell argues that the steps taken are not to “oppose China,” the reality is that few believe that (and those who say they do) could direct former President Clinton , arguing over the definition of “counter”). Leaving aside the language of lawyers, make no mistake, the region sees travel as part of the US Indo-Pacific strategy to limit the perceived threat from rising China.
In fact, a critical element of the Indo-Pacific strategy is to apply to China, without appearing to be entirely for China. This is partly because no matter how tense the relationship has become, there is no reason to inflame it unnecessarily. This is partly due to the fact that the administration is skeptical that much progress can be made in direct negotiations with China and that there are real opportunities to expand and deepen ties across the region with more countries with unanimity, countries that share concerns about muscles of China. bending in the neighborhood.
However, among those who see the strategy as its core effort to curb China are the Chinese. The Hong Kong South China Morning Post presented the trip as part of a Cold War strategy. Chinese Politburo member Yang Jiechi, a former US ambassador, warned Sullivan in a phone call on May 18 that “the United States has taken a series of wrong words and actions to interfere in China’s internal affairs and harm China’s interests.” “And that China will take decisive action to protect its sovereignty and security …
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