Henry Kissinger, who is fast approaching his 100th birthday, is still extremely capable of leading a clear argument and commanding world titles. At the World Economic Forum this week, he called on Ukraine to soften its heroism with wisdom and called for negotiations over the “next two months”. Ukraine would be a “significant player”, but it should not wage a “war against Russia itself”. Russia has been an ‘essential part’ of the ‘European balance’ for 400 years, and Ukraine must be content to be a ‘neutral country’.
This is a classic example of a realistic approach to international relations, led by Kissinger since he wrote his doctorate in 1954 on the post-Napoleonic reconstruction of Europe. Realism sees states as rational and long-term actors, acting through high-level diplomacy aimed at mitigating conflict. Although it is often dismissed as “real politics” devoid of morality or “pacification” devoid of courage, it contains its own ethics.
Being realistic is certainly ethical, and caring more about results than rhetoric and emotion can be deeply moral. Kissinger is worried about the long-term danger that the war in Ukraine will create an increasingly confrontational and chaotic world.
The sour test of realism is whether it works. The appeasement of Hitler by Neville Chamberlain in 1938 is the worst example in the modern history of realism that does not work. Chamberlain wanted to treat Hitler rationally: to understand his demands and to make reasonable concessions in order to avoid the catastrophe of World War II, which he rightly feared. But Hitler was not rational and the catastrophe came.
Moreover, the rejection of Hitler’s demands for Czechoslovakia, even to war, would probably lead to its overthrow. But surrendering to him made his internal situation inviolable and tempted the Soviet Union to enter into an effective alliance with Germany, which led directly to the horrors of World War II.
We could see the problem the world is facing now as a conflict of two forms of realism, as in 1938: is it more realistic to make concessions to the aggressor in the hope of avoiding worse, or to resist, to defeat the aggressor and deter others? China today is in a situation comparable to that of the Soviet Union in 1939, when it signed a pact with the triumphant aggressor Hitler.
Kissinger’s view – or his pacifier interpretation – is already being embraced by those who want the war to end as soon as possible. As in 1938, for some it is an instinctive quasi-pacifist reflex. We see him today in Germany. There are also many whose strong economic and political interests are to return to normal and persuade Russia to return to the bosom. Among them are much of the German establishment and Emmanuel Macron in France.
So soon we could see the unraveling of the much-vaunted solidarity of the democratic world and NATO. On the one hand, we will probably find Britain, most of the Eastern European and Scandinavian countries, and Biden’s America. On the other hand, Germany, France, Hungary and most of the non-aligned world, which understandably fear the economic consequences of a war that is not theirs.
Peacekeepers may have their way and Russia can be offered a symbolic victory. The language of Kissinger and others is already undermining the negotiating position of the Ukrainians. Why should Putin make any concessions if he thinks the opposition is weakening? His inner authority, like Hitler’s, would be strengthened even by semi-success. What’s worse is that so far China seems to be withdrawing its support for Russia and considering attacking Taiwan twice: but what if Putin proves that the West is as divided and weak as its enemies hope? ?
The danger of appeasement is that it strengthens and encourages the aggressors and, at best, slows down the conflict, while worsening possible reliance. But Kissinger said something that went unnoticed: that the solution should be to return to the status quo. That should mean Russia’s retreat to its starting point, liberating the Ukrainian coast and leaving Putin with nothing to show for his costly and devastating war. No matter how you turn it, it would be a defeat. The West should not think of anything less.
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