Andrew A. Michta is Dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He is a former professor of national security at the US Naval College and a former senior fellow at the Center for European Policy Analysis.
In its fourth month, the war in Ukraine is increasingly turning into a war of attrition, crushing Ukrainian and Russian forces, leading to even more indiscriminate killings of civilians by Russian shelling and the destruction of the country’s infrastructure.
There is a rising chorus among Western European politicians and national security experts on the need for an immediate ceasefire, with several European governments fearing that if the battle is not stopped, the war could escalate to the point where Russian President Putin will resort to chemical or nuclear weapons. Hence the palpable mistrust, especially in France and Germany, over the supply of heavy weapons to Ukraine, especially those that would allow it to turn the masses of Russia over and liberate occupied territory.
However, the rising ceasefire chorus in the West also reveals a lack of strategic imagination on what Europe might look like if Kyiv gets enough weapons and support to defeat the Russian army on the ground.
This lack of imagination, more than any other factor, explains the restrained trajectory of French and German support for Ukraine, which allows Kyiv to continue to fight but does not offer a clear path to victory.
There are similar voices in the United States, which say Ukraine’s support diverts domestic priorities. While other well-meaning critics of US support for Ukraine say we are simply prolonging its pain and that the difference in strength between the two warring parties ultimately means that there can only be a Russian victory.
But in reality, all these conversations are steeped in Cold War-era remnants, with the Russian Federation seen as an extension of the former Soviet Union in terms of its military capabilities. This “don’t poke the bear” mentality reflects the West’s continuing fear of Russia, which in turn has created a strong impetus for self-restraint, especially now that the last three decades of de facto disarmament have left much of Europe with no real military capabilities. are used in crisis. So we are witnessing endless speculations as to which weapons should not be sent to Ukraine to ensure that our aid is not seen as ‘escalating’.
However, over the past three months, the West, and especially the United States, has steadily increased its military aid to Ukraine, making Russia pay dearly for Putin’s stupidity. And the structure of the latest US aid package is a recognition that this will be a long, protracted war.
And yet, as long as the Ukrainians manage to gain enough capabilities to suppress Russian artillery and long-range missiles, this will remain a dishonest battle with a predictable end. Putin’s forces will continue to move forward – now holding a corridor along the Black Sea in southern Ukraine – as they slowly but relentlessly expand into Donbass.
Every nation has a turning point, and in a war of attrition like this, those with more resources and capabilities eventually prevail. But this is not necessarily the case – excellent motivation, training and especially Western equipment can compensate for Russia’s numerical advantages.
Let us first consider the consequences of the defeat of Ukraine. At this point, any ceasefire would allow Putin to retain the occupied territory, and the rest of Ukraine’s main state – deprived of its industrial basin to the east and Russia’s ongoing Black Sea blockade – will not be able to sustain itself economically. More importantly, in a few years, Putin will regroup, rebuild his army, and be able to launch a new round of conquest to take over all of Ukraine – especially if the ceasefire agreement involves lifting sanctions on Western imports. , which is crucial for its production of weapons.
In such a future “third war”, will the Ukrainian people still have enough determination and firmness to fight back, and will the West be ready to provide the necessary weapons and supplies again? There is no way to answer these questions in any meaningful way, but it is reasonable to assume that after virtually losing this war, the Ukrainian nation will find that its position in power will diminish further.
Currently, the biggest obstacle for the West to provide full military and economic support to Ukraine is our inability to imagine a new energy configuration in Eastern Europe – one based on NATO’s Mediterranean Baltic-Black Sea corridor. in line with the United States And while Finland and Sweden are preparing to join NATO, Europe is on the verge of a potentially transformative geopolitical reconfiguration, similar to the end of the First World War.
Defending Ukraine is not only about national sovereignty and territorial integrity – historically the two fundamental principles of democratic governance – but ultimately about pushing Russia out of Europe, thus ending its three centuries of imperial aspirations. Ukraine’s independence, and in addition to Belarus’s – since once Ukraine defends its sovereignty and territorial integrity, Minsk will not stay in Moscow’s orbit for long – will put an end to Russia’s claims to be a key “Eurasian power in Europe”.
As such, for the first time in the modern era, this will force Moscow to come to terms with what is needed, economically and politically, to become a “normal” nation-state.
At the geostrategic level, the emergence of a free, independent and prosperous Ukraine united with the West would also put an end to the two-border crisis that the Sino-Russian alliance has sought to create for the United States. their continued close alliance with America as vital to their security and ready to do their part to strengthen defense, the United States will be free to focus on the upcoming race with China in the Indo-Pacific region, which will lead to the so-called turning to Asia ”the debate is largely controversial.
Last but not least, the defeat of the Russian military in Ukraine will pave the way for a fundamental reconfiguration of power distribution in Europe, shifting the focus from the Franco-German tandem to a Central European constellation that includes Germany, Poland, the Scandinavians, the Baltics and most importantly Ukraine.
With its vast range of natural resources and one of the richest agricultural lands on earth, rebuilding Ukraine – rebuilt not as a post-Soviet state but as a thriving democracy and closely integrated into the European economy – would fundamentally change the dynamics of power in both Europe. and worldwide.
This war, which was imposed on Ukraine and the West by Putin’s neo-imperial plan, has already changed Europe. He gave the democratic West the opportunity that is given only once every four or five generations – with the chance to rework the geopolitical map of the continent.
Let us have the courage to help Ukraine win.
The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policies or positions of the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, the United States Department of Defense, or the United States Government.
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