The joint visit to Kyiv of the leaders of France, Germany, Italy and Romania was a turning point. Earlier, the question was whether Ukraine would receive EU candidate status. This is now the likely outcome, reinforced by the European Commission’s recommendation in favor of the next day’s candidacy.
For the three Western Europeans, who at times contradicted their Ukrainian counterpart, Vladimir Zelensky, for appearing too impartial in their response to the war, the trip was a redemption. In particular, French President Emmanuel Macron would be foolish to come if he had to continue arguing about the candidate status that Zelensky is calling on the EU to provide.
But bigger than any diplomatic mistake would be a deeper geopolitical mistake in denying candidate status altogether.
In the months since Ukraine applied for membership, days after the war, a number of concerns have been expressed. Candidate status is simply symbolic. The road to real membership is long and arduous. The EU would be dysfunctional with more members, so its governance needs to be reformed before adopting new ones.
The argument that the EU is unlikely to allow Ukraine to become a member in the end, so it would be cruel and unreasonable to give false hopes, is the most cynical objection to the candidacy. But all these are so many red herrings.
Both the admission process and the EU’s decision-making procedures really need to be made more efficient – but that is no reason not to apply. If nothing else, the start of accession negotiations with Ukraine is the best incentive for the EU to turn its attention to solving these problems. And if the status of a candidate is really merely symbolic, granting it is invaluable, and withholding it would simply reveal the cowardice of the EU.
At the heart of the debate over Ukraine’s candidacy is a difference in attitudes. In a turbulent world, should the EU’s goal be to isolate Europeans from problems on their borders or beyond? Or is it to use what powers the bloc has to transform these problems into something more favorable?
This tension between isolation and commitment, or between adapting to or influencing a changing world order, culminates in the question of what to do with Ukraine.
The key to it is the position of France. Macron is constantly pushing for a more active EU to shape the world around him. But it is in the French tradition to suggest that external power comes from more internal coherence. The French political establishment is inclined to insist on deepening cooperation with the EU instead of expanding it to more countries. It has always seen the latter as an obstacle to strengthening its own influence as a medium-sized power, projecting it across the EU.
Hence the insistence – most recently in Macron’s speech in Strasbourg last month – on overcoming the veto to make faster decisions. Macron also called for a wider “European political community” for those who are not yet ready for EU membership or will never be. In the case of Ukraine, as in the Western Balkans, French officials are quick to suggest that an EU with even more members today would be cumbersome to the point of paralysis.
But Putin’s war against Ukraine makes that prospect untenable. Not because the risk of clumsiness is not real. But because if the goal is to attract other countries to adopt the European way of life and limit the power of those who would undermine it, nothing is progressing more than Ukraine’s irreversible commitment to the European system of rules. There has never been a better opportunity for this, nor will there be.
The Commission notes that Ukraine has already adopted parts of EU rules. Extensive inquiries from Brussels about the application were answered in record time, even under the pressure of war. Ukraine’s pro-Western civil society wants to use candidate status to pressure politicians for more reforms.
In other words, this is a case in which the real impetus for enlargement would strengthen rather than threaten the French goal of a more insistent EU. The tension between means and ends in French thinking still exists, but Macron’s visit to Kyiv may at least be a recognition of that. Along with calls for further reforms included in the commission’s ruling, this could give other skeptical member states a cover for gaining the same recognition. If that turns out to be the case, it would be a great conclusion to the last summit of the French EU Presidency.
martin.sandbu@ft.com
Add Comment