In the sixth month of Russia’s attack on Ukraine, it is time to take a mid-term review of the progress of the war. The question of who wins and who loses is often asked, but such binary questions are confused by the complexity of the situation. Indeed, one wonders if winning or losing is a meaningful concept at all.
The 19th century military theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, in declaring war to be the continuation of politics by other means, suggested that the active warfare phase of a conflict is simply a period of violent activity that changes the situation on the ground before the resumption of Negotiate. With the obvious exception of World War II, most modern conflicts end in negotiations rather than outright victory on the battlefield. Ukraine will almost certainly follow this pattern.
Any hope Vladimir Putin had of a quick decisive victory collapsed amid the sheer ineptitude of his army’s failed attack on Kyiv in the early days of the war. Before February 24, as he massed his intimidating and menacing forces on the Ukrainian border, Putin was the world leader to whose door other leaders in the West wanted to beat a path. Although he was threatening, he was in an extremely powerful position, but after launching his totally incompetent “special military operation” he became a pariah with credible accusations of genocide tarnishing his hands.
If Putin’s aggressive behavior before February 24 was intended to split the West, he failed in that strategic goal, just as the early operational failure of his armed forces brought initial success on the ground to Ukraine.
Still, in his determination to redraw the borders of Eastern Europe, the Russian president is ensuring that the second stage of his campaign moves on to more achievable operational goals – namely securing a land corridor between Crimea and Russia itself and capturing the two Donbass. Donetsk and Luhansk provinces. On the battlefield, the Russian military has switched to tactics more reminiscent of the Soviet-era Red Army: massive and sustained artillery and cruise missile strikes on close targets to reduce Ukrainian defenses and on deep targets to undermine civilian morale. They have mixed results.
Applying relentless pressure, the Russians have bloodied their way through most of the two Donbas provinces and secured the land corridor from Crimea. But it comes at a huge human cost. Reliable sources suggest that the Russian army may have lost around 40,000 men in combat, and many times that number wounded, missing or captured. Such losses are unbearable for armed forces, especially those not fully mobilized on a combat basis (Putin is still reluctant to admit that he is actually waging a war).
At home, pressure from mothers of soldiers is mounting, reminiscent of the conflict in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1989. And in Ukraine, the supply of Western weapons and ammunition is turning the tide of success to the defenders, even encouraging limited counterattacks such as recently in the Kherson region.
But back to the interim audit, do these developments suggest that either side is winning? The provisional conclusion must be negative. The Russians are approaching a tipping point where, if they succeed in capturing the Donbass, they will be exhausted and unable to push further west, while the Ukrainians, reinforced with Western weapons and training, will be able to hold new defensive lines in the east of their country. As winter approaches, the conflict on the ground looks set to hit a dead end, much like a deep freeze.
Far from the battlefield, other strategic influences are at work. The breakdown of diplomatic relations with the West, the wariness of China and India, and the ambivalence of most African countries leave Putin in a very isolated position on the world stage. Yet, at the same time, the economic picture appears to be moving in Putin’s favor. Sanctions may have a negative effect on the Russian economy, but the ruble is strong and revenues from continued energy supplies to the West support the Russian military machine.
Moreover, reduced supplies, especially of oil, to the West are being eagerly bought up by the East Asian market. And now, as winter approaches, energy-hungry countries such as Germany, Austria and Italy, struggling to diversify their energy supplies, may begin to unravel the West’s current cohesion, giving Putin a glimpse of achieving this strategic goal of dividing NATO.
In addition, international pressure led by the UN to restart the flow of Ukrainian grain exports to avert a food crisis in developing countries led Russia and Ukraine to a reluctant agreement on the matter. Resentment has been underscored by missile strikes this week on the grain port of Odessa.
The combination of military, diplomatic and economic factors leads to the eventual conclusion that Clausewitz’s moment to resume negotiations may have arrived. The UK is leading the West in agreeing with President Zelensky that the situation on the ground should return to that of February 24 and Crimea should eventually be returned to Ukraine – but that is not going to happen. The Russians will not withdraw voluntarily, the Ukrainians are hardly strong enough to throw them out, and the West will never consider an Iraq-style operation to drive them out.
Vladimir Putin will continue to stay firmly under his nuclear umbrella, and Volodymyr Zelensky may have to accept that around 20 percent of sovereign Ukrainian territory is under Russian occupation.
This is the changed situation in which negotiations are likely to resume, but the most important thing is that Zelensky himself should decide to negotiate, and not because of Western pressure to do so. The West should continue to support Ukraine and not start dictating to it, although some European countries would like this war to end sooner rather than later for their own economic and energy reasons.
It should be clear by now that the interim conclusion of this audit is closer to a fierce tie than a win or loss for either side. Even if the situation in Ukraine is likely to remain deeply unsatisfactory for that country, Putin’s aggression should not be considered a success. NATO’s future posture must be determined to deter Russian aggression, as it was during the Cold War, but this comes at an obvious and unavoidable cost: defense spending will have to increase.
Member states will make their own decisions on this front, and in the UK it is already a topical issue in the context of the Conservative leadership election.
Boris Johnson has promised to increase our defense spending from 2 per cent to 2.5 per cent of GDP by the end of the decade. Now Liz Truss has promised to raise it to 3 percent. So it’s no surprise that Defense Secretary Ben Wallace, popular among the party faithful for his handling of the Ukraine crisis, announced his support for her campaign this week.
Ukraine is fighting for our values at a huge cost in blood and treasure. The least we can do is reach deeper into our own pockets to honor that commitment and sacrifice.
General Lord Dannatt was Chief of the General Staff from 2006 to 2009
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